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STRAIGHT PAST GO AND COLLECT $200: A
LOOK INTO THE CLAYTON ACT AND VERTICAL
MERGERS WITHIN CORPORATE AMERICA

INTRODUCTION
In the game of Monopoly, the goal is to purchase and develop as
much property as possible while forcing your competitors out of the real
estate market.' While Monopoly does not directly describe the concepts
behind vertical mergers, the ideals of gaining power and merging to ensure
ultimate market power are the same.2 A monopoly is a "market structure
characterized by a single seller, selling a unique product in the market.. .in
a monopoly market, the seller faces no competition, as he is the sole seller
of goods with no close substitute."' Many view monopolies as anticonsumer, which inflict an overall negative effect on the economy because
of their inherit ability to limit choice and, in turn, provide an inferior product
due to the lack of competition.' This fear has grown exponentially in the last
few centuries, and the reality that only a select and powerful few control the
wide economic market is now a major concern.' When faced with the
concept of monopolies, the prevailing thought is that one company controls
a single industry; however, more commonly in the current climate,

' See

Monopoly

Board

Game,

ENCYCLOPEDIA

BRITANNICA,

https://www.britannica.com/topic/Monopoly-board-game (last visited Feb. 25, 2018) (identifying
rules of Monopoly).
2 See Jonida Lamaj, The Evolution ofAntitrust Law in USA, 113 EuRO. Sci. J. 154, 157 (2017)
(discussing importance of competition in market). Without competition, a company would not
have the incentive to produce a better product or market their product at a competitive price. Id.
Notable industries affected by monopoly power are pharmaceutical companies, the health industry,
technology, media, the cable industry, and airlines. Id
See
Definition
of
'Monopoly',
ECONOMIC
TIMES,
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/definition/monopoly (last visited Jan. 17, 2019) (defining
monopoly).
4 See Lamaj, supra note 2, at 154 (explaining history of monopolies). The United States does
not ban monopolies, but does ban monopolization. Id. at 155. This keeps the individual's right to
contract intact with limitations on certain mergers and acquisitions that could be seen to
substantially lower competition in a given market. Id.
5 See id. at 161 (analyzing growing fear of monopolies in current age).
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companies are not only merging in their own industry but with industries
outside their own, which creates powerful multi-industry empires.6
Over a century ago, the United States Congress passed the Sherman
Act of 1890 in an effort to combat growing public concern regarding the
concentration of wealth and a single entity's economic power in a given
market.' To continue its efforts, twenty-four years later, Congress passed
the Clayton Act of 1914 and the Federal Trade Commission Act.'
Subsequently, Congress passed the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936, the
Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950, and the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust
Improvements Act of 1976.9
When Congress began passing antitrust regulations, their focus was
primarily on regulating the classic monopoly of direct competitors merging,
and it was not until the Clayton Act when regulation on non-direct
competitors was introduced.'o The current trend of using the Clayton Act in
conjunction with the Sherman Act has led to further regulation of not only
direct but indirect competitors." Three major concerns when two companies
are allowed to vertically merge pertain to the possibility that: (1) it can lead
to exclusionary effects by increasing rivals' costs of doing business and
block ways of entry for emerging businesses; (2) it can lead to coordination

6 See Jessica Roy, 4 CorporateMergers Shot Down By the Government, SPLINTER NEWS,
(Feb.
https://splinternews.coml/4-corporate-mergers-shot-down-by-the-government-1793840916
26, 2014) (describing corporate mergers shot down). In recent years, several cases have been turned
down in an effort to merge. Id. These denials have included companies with massive market power,
for example, AT&T and Time Warner. Id.
7 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 2 (2004) (providing language of Sherman Act).

Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire
with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony,
and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $100,000,000 if a
corporation, or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding 10
years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
Id.; see also John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The FundamentalGoal OfAntitrust: Protecting
Consumers, Not IncreasingEfficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REv 191, 203-05 (2008) (outlining
Congress's need to pass laws addressing antitrust issues). The Sherman Act sought to protect trade
and commerce by making monopolization a felony offence. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2.
8
See Lamaj, supra note 2, at 156 (discussing history of Clayton Act and Federal Trade
Commission). The Federal Trade Commission Act established the Federal Trade Commission as
a branch under the U.S. Department of Justice in 1914 to prosecute injustices, unfair, and deceptive
acts and/or practices in commerce. Id. The Federal Trade Commission has the power to investigate
suspected violations of Antitrust laws. Id.
' See Lamaj, supra note 2, at 156 (discussing growing antitrust legislation).
10 See Michael H. Riordan & Steven C. Salop, Evaluating Vertical Mergers: A Post-Chicago
Approach, 63 ANTYTRUST L.J. 513, 515 (1995) (discussing evolution of vertical mergers).
" See Lamaj, supranote 2, at 161 (discussing Clayton Act evolution).
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of pricing and price sharing; and (3) it can facilitate price fixing.12 When a
company merges with another company in a separate industry, a typical
horizontal merger is not created; instead, this type of merger is identified as
a vertical merger.13 These vertical mergers still disrupt the markets in a
similar way.14 Historically, vertical mergers have not been prosecuted at an
equal rate as horizontal mergers.'s While the United States Department of
Justice ("DOJ") tries around thirty horizontal merger cases a year, it was
only recently that they attempted to block the vertical merger between AT&T
and Comcast, a first for the DOJ within the last four decades.1 6 This
extremely rare attempt to block the merger indicates a new initiative by the
DOJ to regulate and scrutinize vertical mergers. 17 As will be discussed in
detail, the U.S. Court of Appeals of the D.C. Circuit's allowance of the
AT&T and Time Warner merger creates conflict and confusion regarding the
harm large vertical mergers can have on society and economic markets."
While there is significant case law and statutes regulating horizontal
mergers, the same cannot be said for vertical mergers.' 9 Without clear
guidelines, antitrust regulations, specifically the Clayton Act, cannot
perform the purposes they were designed for.20 This note will (I) examine
See Riordan, supra note 10, at 519-20 (noting concerns with vertical merging).
See id. (discussing difference in horizontal and vertical mergers).
14 See id. at 515 (defining vertical mergers). The magnitude of power gained when companies
vertically merge disrupts the markets in a similar way as horizontal mergers. Id.
1 See Noah Brumfield, INSIGHT: Rare CourtDecision Clarifies U.S. Merger Control Rules
for Vertical Deals, BLOOMBERG, (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.bna.com/insight-rare-courtn73014481742/ (discussing difference between vertical and horizontal prosecution).
6 See id. (explaining AT&T and Time Warner merger). The DOJ believed the merger would
allow the single company to "leverage its distribution strengths to increase costs to its rivals for
must-have cable and satellite television content." Id The DOJ was unsuccessful in their efforts.
Id.
" See id. (discussing DOJ's previous lack of vertical merger prosecution).
1s See id. (criticizing lack of certainty in vertical merger decisions).
19 See Brumfield, supra note 15 (explaining Clayton Act's purpose). The Clayton Act of 1914
is one of the only pieces of legislation speaking to the regulation of vertical mergers. Id.
20 See Daniel R. Warren, Stress Fractures:The Need To Stop And Repair The Growing Divide
In Circuit Court Application Of Summary JudgmentIn Antitrust Litigation, 35 REv. BANKING
FIN. L. 380, 383-84 (2015) (discussing importance of uniformity).
12

&

1

Historically, on an international level, the Sherman Act can be seen as a successful
unification of disparate state antitrust standards, which replaced conflicting and
ineffective regulations. However, the advantages of reducing costs by switching to a
uniform federal antitrust system rather than disparate state antitrust systems could be lost
if that federal system were no longer uniform. The costs of compliance are magnified
when conforming to overlapping laws or different interpretations of the same law, as
firms could struggle to correctly understand which actions are allowed and which are not
according to different interpretations of conflicting laws.
Id. at 384.
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the legislative history and landmark cases to analyze the purpose of antitrust
regulations; (II) analyze the current climate surrounding vertical mergers
including recent merger decisions by the Federal Trade Commission; and
(I11) examine recent Supreme Court and circuit courts decisions regarding
vertical mergers to evaluate whether stricter regulation is necessary. 2 1
HISTORY
Antitrust regulation began when several goliath businesses,
particularly in the railroad and steel industries, created common-law "trusts"
that allowed businesses to centrally control an entire industry.2 2 While these
"trusts" initially started in the steel and railroad industry, they gradually
made their way to almost every industry in America, including oil, telephone,
cotton, and whiskey.23 Americans grew very concerned with the power these
trusts held, and Congress reacted by drafting the Sherman Act of 1890.24 In
1890, Congress passed The Sherman Act making it the first piece of United
States legislation to regulate monopolies and antitrust behaviors.2 5

21 See infra Part I (examining history of antitrust cases); see infra Part II (analyzing vertical
mergers today); see infra Part III (analyzing cases regarding vertical mergers).
22 See Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as The OriginalandPrimary Concern ofAntitrust:
The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 67-69 (1982) (discussing history
behind anti-trust regulation).
23 See id. at 67-70 (discussing circumstances leading to Sherman Act).
24 See id. (illustrating concern leading to Sherman Act). Antitrust laws were passed to
encourage competition and market efficiency, but many believe it goes farther than that with "a
number of social, moral, and political concerns" as well. Id. at 68. Senator John Sherman presented
the bill, which had two key sections dealing with restraints of trade and monopolization. Id at 84.
25 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2004) (outlining provisions of Sherman Act). Section One and Two
of the Sherman Act are as follows:
(1)

(2)

Id.

Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
hereby declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage
in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed
guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not
exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $1,000,000 or by
imprisonment not exceeding ten years, or by both said punishments, in the
discretion of the court.
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty
of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding
$100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or by
imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or by both said punishments, in the
discretion of the court.
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Once passed, several questions arose regarding the constitutionality
of the government's regulation of businesses and commerce to the extent that
the statute allowed. 26 In the ground-breaking case, Standard Oil v. United
States, the United States brought suit against Standard Oil Company of New
Jersey for violating the Sherman Act. 2 7 Along with ruling that Standard Oil
did violate the Sherman Act by having an unreasonable restraint on trade,
the Court also discussed whether Congress exceeded its constitutional power
by enacting the Sherman Act in light of the Commerce Clause. 28 The
Commerce Clause is an enumerated power that allows the federal
government to regulate foreign and domestic interstate trade.29 The Court
held that Congress did not violate the Commerce Clause and did not exceed
its authority to regulate commerce.3 0
As the industrious growth in modem America began to exceed what
the writers of the Sherman Act imagined, an amendment was needed,
resulting in the Clayton Act in 1914.31 The Clayton Act amended the
Sherman Act by including additional provisions.3 2 During this time in
26 See Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 31 (1911) (holding
defendant had violated Section One of Sherman Antitrust Act); see also U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Sherman Anti Trust Act of 1890 Society for Human Resource Management, SHRM.ORG (Apr. 21,
https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/legal-and-compliance/employment2016),
law/pages/sherman-anti-trust-act.aspx (discussing Standard Oil violation). The violation was based
on "its excessive restrictions on trade, particularly its practices of eliminating competitors by
buying them out directly and by driving them out of business by temporarily slashing prices in a
given region." Id.
27 See Standard Oil Co., 221 U.S. at 70-74 (providing facts of Standard Oil's violation). By
essentially owning all of the oil companies throughout the United States, Standard Oil has put an
unreasonable restrain on trade. Id at 74.
28 See id. at 69-70 (illustrating Court's differing opinion); cf United States v. E.C. Knight Co.,
156 U.S. 1 (1895). The Court held that the American Sugar Refining Company had not violated
the Sherman Act despite the fact that it controlled approximately ninety-eight percent of all sugar
refining in the U.S. Id. The Court's explained that the company's control of manufacturing did not
constitute control of trade. Id. at 12.
29 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (discussing Congress's power to regulate commerce).
30 See id. (discussing power to regulate interstate commerce gives Congress power to regulate
business agreements and mergers); see also Standard Oil Co., 221 U.S. at 69-70 (discussing
reasonable restraints on trade).
31 See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1914) (discussing text of Sherman Act).

No person engaged in commerce.. .shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any
part of the stock or other share capital and no person subject to the jurisdiction of the
Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another
person engaged also in commerce. . where in any line of commerce.. .in any section of
the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or
tend to create a monopoly.
Id
32 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1914) (providing restrictions on activities relating to interstate
commerce and competition in market place). The provisions specifically attempted to eliminate
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American history, businesses were growing at an unprecedented rate, and the
Clayton Act sought to limit the horizontal combinations of businesses." The
amendment also paid special attention to the regulation of "vertical
mergers." 34 Congress focused on vertical mergers because it became
apparent that solely regulating horizontal mergers did not provide adequate
consumer protection." As opposed to horizontal mergers, vertical mergers
were previously unregulated deals, slowing market competition and stifling
the innovation of goods and services in multiple industries rather than a
singular market.3 6
In 1914, Congress passed the Federal Trade Commission Act, which
established a Commission to investigate and cease unfair business.37 The
Federal Trade Commission is an independent agent with the United States
Government, and within it sits the Bureau of Competition and the
Department of Justice's Anti-Trust Division.3 8 The Commission works with
three main goals in mind; (1) protect consumers; (2) maintain competition;
and (3) advance organizational performance.
In recent decades, two additional amendments to the Clayton
Antitrust Act have been the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936 and the CellerKefauver Act of 1950."4
The Robinson-Patman Act of 1936 focuses
primarily on price discrimination. 4 1 The Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950

price discrimination, buying out competitors, and interlocking boards of directors. Id.; see also
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962) (explaining use of Sherman and Clayton
Act). In Brown Shoe Co., the government challenged the merger of two shoe manufactures. Id. at
296. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision ordering the defendant to completely
divest from the stock, assets, and interests it held with the shoe company it merged with to avoid
unfair business practices. Id. at 344-46.
33 See Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 311-18 (discussing trends of businesses in early 19th
Century that led to amending Sherman Act).
34 See id at 324 (Clayton Act does not render all vertical mergers unlawful). While the Court
concluded vertical mergers are not immediately unlawful, certain mergers that substantially lessen
competition or create monopolies across different industries are restricted. Id.
3s See id. at 317 (discussing Congress's vertical merger regulation).
36 See id. (noting that without competition there would be no innovation).
37 See F.T.C. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967) (reviewing an order by Federal
Trade Commission). The court analyzed a Federal Trade Commission order that required a
manufacturer to divest itself of assets of liquid bleach company on grounds that the merger "might
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in the production and sale of
household liquid bleaches." Id. at 570.
38 See Guide to Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADE COMM'N, www.ftc.gov/bc/antitrust (last visited
Jan. 17, 2019) (discussing placement of Federal Trade Commission in U.S. government).
39 See About The FTC, FED. TRADE COMM'N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc (last visited Feb.
25, 2018) (indicating Federal Trade Commission's benefit to consumers).
40 See 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1936) (providing language of 1936 Robison-Patman Act); see also 64
STAT. 1125 (1950) (identifying Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950).
41 See 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1936) (providing text of Robinson-Patman Act of 1936).
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regulates vertical mergers and was passed to prevent unfair acquisitions still
permitted under the previous regulations, specifically firms that were not in
direct competition with each other.4 2 In United States v. Cont'1 Can Co., the
Supreme Court held that a manufacturer of glass bottles and a manufacturer
of metal cans could not merge even though their products were not in direct
competition, finding that such a merger would violate the Clayton Act and
Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950.43 Finally, the most recent antitrust regulation
went into effect with the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of
1976.44 Signed into law by President Gerald Ford, this amendment "provides
the FTC and the Department of Justice with information about large mergers
and acquisitions before they occur. . .The parties to certain proposed
45
transactions must submit premerger notification to the FTC and DOJ."
Courts have historically used two methods to examine antitrust
violations: the older notion of per se illegality, and the Chicago-based rule

It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different
purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where either or any of the purchases
involved in such discrimination are in commerce, where such commodities are sold for

use, consumption, or resale within the United States or any Territory thereof or the
District of Columbia or any insular possession or other place under the jurisdiction of
the United States, and where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure,
destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives
the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them...
Id.; see also United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 635-36 (1950) (analyzing case
pertaining to salt prices).
Proceedings under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act culminated in a
and
respondents Morton Salt Company
requiring
order
Commission
International Salt Company, together with eighteen other salt producers and a trade
association, to cease and desist from stated practices in connection with the pricing,
producing and marketing of salt.
Id.
42 See United States v. Cont'l Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 447 (1964) (outlining decision criteria
for antitrust cases); see also Arthur Holst, Celler-Kefauver Act, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,

https://www.britannica.com/topic/Celler-Kefauver-Act. (last visited Jan. 17, 2019) (discussing
history of Celler-Kefauver Act).
43 See Cont'1 Can Co., 378 U.S. at 447 (discussing merger violation). Justice White held that
a merger between the second largest can producer and the third largest glass jar producer violated
the Clayton Act despite the contention that specific containers produced by the companies did not
substantially compete in the market. Id. at 443-44.
4 See 15 U.S.C. § 18(a) (2000) (outlining evolution of antitrust laws).
45 See-

Premerger

Notification

Program,

https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/premerger-notification-program
(discussing new regulation in antitrust laws).

FED.

TRADE

COMM'N,

(last visited Feb. 25, 2018)
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of reason approach.4 6 The Chicago School of Thought or "competition
theory" dates back to 1955 and can be attributed to Aaron Director.4 7 This
theory focuses on a rule ofreason approach, as opposed to the courts widely
used per se illegality principal of a monopoly.4 8 While the per se rule is
based off of black-and-white decision making, the Chicago theory centers
around analyzing the possible efficiency and reasoning behind a business's
monopolistic actions before declaring a violation.4 9 A groundbreaking rule
of reason case came in 1899 with Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. UnitedStates,
where the Supreme Court determined whether or not monopolistic activity
was both reasonable and merely ancillary to the main purpose of a lawful
and legitimate contract."o This method of analyzing antitrust cases was
further broadened in Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. United States,
where the Supreme Court reviewed the nature, scope, and effect of the
monopolistic activity and if that activity promoted or restrained

4
See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Reconciling the Harvardand Chicago Schools: A New Antitrust
Approachfor the 21st Century, 82 IND. L.J. 345, 356 (2007) (noting per se presumes illegality while
rule of reason evaluates market control and scope).
4 See Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School ofAntitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 925,
932 (1979) (declaring Aaron Director as founder of Chicago antitrust thought). These methods
were then passed down to his students, including antitrust scholars, Ward Bowman, Robert Bork,
John S. McGee, and Lester G. Telser. Id.
48 See id. (explaining competition theory); see also Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,
370 U.S.
294, 296 (1962) (using of per se illegality); c.f StandardOil Co., 221 U.S. at 31 (highlighting per
se illegality). The seminal antitrust cases of Standard Oil and Brown Shoe both used the per se
theory in their rulings. StandardOil Co., 221 U.S. at 31; Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 296. The
Supreme Court in Brown Shoe and StandardOil first looked to see if they could find monopolistic
practices in the companies' actions, and because monopolistic practices were found, they held that
there had been a violation. StandardOil Co., 221 U.S. at 31; Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 296.
49 See Richard A. Posner, The ChicagoSchool ofAntitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 925,
927 (1979) (describing pillars of competition theory).

To illustrate, it makes no sense for a monopoly producer to take over distribution in order
to earn monopoly profits at the distribution as well as the manufacturing level. The
product and its distribution are complements, and an increase in the price of distribution
will reduce the demand for the product. Assuming that the product and its distribution
are sold in fixed proportions, and thus that the price discrimination analysis is
inapplicable, the conclusion is reached that vertical integration must be motivated by a
desire for efficiency rather than for monopoly.
Id; see also Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Reconciling the Harvard and Chicago Schools: A New
Antitrust Approachfor the 21st Century, 82 IND. L.J. 345, 35-52 (2007) (discussing per se and rule
of reason).
50 See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 229 (1899) (illustrating
Supreme Court's use of rule of reasoning over per se). The Supreme Court found a violation of
the Sherman Act because of Addyston Pipe & Steel's practice of price fixing and dividing territories
between the two companies. Id.
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The rule of reason theory also supports the economic
competition."
there
is an injustice in the market, the market will correct
that
if
principle
itself without the interference of the courts or the government.5 2 Since the
Sherman Act enactment, courts have used both the per se illegality method
and the Chicago School's rule of reasoning approach to evaluate antitrust
matters, however, the rule of reason has been the prevailing method for the
courts recently, leaving the per se illegality method for the history books."
The trend of giving preference to the rule of reason may be a prevailing
reason why vertical mergers have been difficult to regulate in recent years. 54
FACTS
Vertical Mergers and The Clayton Act
Historically, courts have been more relaxed in regulating vertical
mergers in comparison to other anti-trust violations." One unique instance
where the Supreme Court has addressed an issue of vertical mergers was in
1962 with Brown Shoe Co. v. United States.5 6 The Court explained that to
find a vertical merger antitrust violation, the companies need to be within the

5
See Bd. of Trade of City of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 239-40 (1918) (showing
Supreme Court's favored use of rule of reason over per se approach). The Court did not find a
violation because the Board of Trade's use of monopolistic activity was reasonable in order to
promote fair competition and trade. Id. at 240-45.
52 See Piraino,supranote 48, at 350 (discussing court's limited involvement under competitive
theory). The Chicago School of Thought believed that courts should only "intervene in the
competitive process when it was clear, after thorough study, that anticompetitive conduct was
threatening consumer welfare." Id.
53 See Piraino,supra note 48, at 354 (explaining increased use of rule of reason opposed to per
se). "The most dramatic retreat from per se analysis occurred in 1977 when, in Continental T V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., the Supreme Court reversed its decision in Schwinn and decided that
nonprice vertical restrictions should be judged by the rule of reason." Id
54 See Cont'l Television v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 37, 54-55 (1977) (discussing rule of reason
used in vertical merger cases).
55 See Michael H. Riordan & Steven C. Salop, Evaluating Vertical Mergers: A Post-Chicago
Approach, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 513, 515 (1995) (explaining how vertical mergers have historically
been seen as neutral and in favor of competition). The Chicago School of Thinking's view on
vertical mergers has been that mergers generally help competition and are better for consumer
product and choice. Id. at 513-14.
56 See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962) (discussing competition in
vertical mergers). In Brown Shoe, the Court explained that vertical mergers deny competitors the
opportunity to compete but further explains how the Clayton Act does not necessarily render
vertical mergers entirely unlawful. Id. "[D]etermination of the relevant market is a necessary
predicate to a finding of a violation of the Clayton Act because the threatened monopoly must be
one which will substantially lessen competition 'within the area of effective competition.'
Substantiality can be determined only in terms of the market affected." Id. at 324.
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same product market.57 Another early prominent case in determining the
scope and limits to vertical mergers was FordMotor Co. v. United States."
In Ford, the government brought suit against Ford Motor Company for
purchasing $28 million worth of the Electric Automobile Company." When
the case was heard in the United States District Court of Michigan, the lower
court discussed the importance of analyzing the product markets of each
entity that intended to merge to determine if it would create unfair
competition to the market.' The government argued that the Clayton Act
had been violated because the merger would combine wide-reaching preexisting distribution networks.'
The Supreme Court agreed with the
government and held that Ford's acquisition constituted a violation of the
Clayton Act because the acquisition substantially lessened competition in
automotive batteries and spark plug markets across the country.62 I
addition, the Court reasoned that the phrase "in any line of commerce" under
the Clayton Act is all encompassing, and if "the forbidden effect or tendency
is produced in one out of all the various lines of commerce" then a violation
of the Clayton Act will be present.63
Since Brown and Ford, there have been minimal influential cases
involving violation of the Clayton Act through vertical mergers because of
5

See id. at 325 (describing scope of Clayton Act).
Clayton Act prohibits any merger which may substantially lessen competition 'in any
line of commerce', it is necessary to examine the effects of a merger in each such
economically significant submarket to determine if there is a reasonable probability that
the merger will substantially lessen competition. If such a probability is found to exist,
the merger is proscribed.

Id. at 325.
58 See Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 564 (1972) (discussing important early
case in vertical merger history). This case was brought in violation of Celler-Kefauver Anti-Merger
Act. Id
s9 See United States v. Ford Motor Co., 286 F. Supp. 407,409 (E.D. Mich. 1968) (noting Fords
efforts to streamline by purchasing manufacturing plant).
60 See id. at 411 (stressing importance of analyzing product markets for fairness in market
competition). The government's argument against this acquisition predicted a high likelihood of
"probable substantial lessening of competition in four lines of commerce." Id. These four lines of
commerce were automobiles, automotive batteries, spark plugs, and ignition parts. Id. Ford did not
dispute that automobiles, automotive batteries, and spark plugs had their own commercial chains,
but disputed that ignition plugs have a market of their own. Id
61 See id. at 418 (citing governments argument for Clayton Act violation in Ford).
62 See id. at 441 (finding Clayton and Celler-Kefauver Act violation). The Court assumed that
the merge would not create a monopoly in automobiles or industries for automobile parts, but still
concluded that this type of merger was a per se violation of the Sherman Act. Id. The Court
determined that the agreement would have a "pervasive impact on the replacement market for spark
plugs" and be a barrier to entry for others, resulting in a violation of the Celler-Kefauver AntiMerger Act. Id. at 429.
63 See id at 445 (explaining reasoning behind Ford).
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the "apparent lack of competitive concern" that a Clayton Act violation
expresses.' In 1997, the Supreme Court heard Continental Television v.
GTE Sylvania, a case involving an agreement between a manufacturer and a
seller of television sets."5 In Sylvania, the Court determined that while the
per se illegality reasoning used in previous antitrust cases is still a valid
method of analysis, the Court may also need to look at other factors such as
market share and scope.66
In 1977, the DOJ failed to halt a vertical merger with a potential
violation of Section 7 of the Clayton act in United States v. Hammermill
PaperCo.67 In Hammermill, the U.S. District Court for the Western District
of Pennsylvania took the rule of reason approach by looking at the line of
commerce, market shares, and the distribution process to determine that
there was not a legitimate threat on consumers resulting from the merger.68
Another significant decision is from the Second Circuit in FruehaufCorp. v.

6 See James A. Keyte & Kenneth B. Schwartz, Getting Vertical Mergers Through the
(2015)
3,
30
ANTITRUST
29
a
Deal, "
Make
"Let's
Agencies:
https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPagehandle=hein.journals/antitruma29&div=42&id=&page
(addressing high-bar violation standards under 1982 FTC updated merger guidelines).
61 See Cont'l Television v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 37, 54-55 (1977) (finding per se method
not applicable when determining antitrust violation). The Court found the rule of reason approach
was warranted instead of the per se method that had been used in previous vertical merger cases.
Id.
6 See id. (differentiating rule of reason and per se illegal approaches).
67 See United States v. Hammermill Paper Co., 429 F. Supp. 1271, 1293 (W.D. Pa. 1977)
(holding DOJ's position). The DOJ attempted to block two paper wholesalers from purchasing a
paper manufacturer. Id. The DOJ failed to convince the court that the purchase was unreasonable.
Id. The court rejected the government's reasoning based on the history between the companies, the
insufficient evidence of limiting either field from competition and that foreclosure would be
profitable for the market structure. Id.
3. The following is the line of commerce within the meaning of Section 7 of the Clayton
Act:
The manufacture and sale of printing and fine paper;
4. As to this line of commerce the United States as a whole is the appropriate section of
the country within the meaning of Section 7 of the Clayton Act;
5. The effect of the acquisition by Hammermill Paper Company of the assets of Western
Newspaper Union and the capital stock of Carter Rice Storrs and Bement, Inc. will not
be substantially to lessen competition in the lines of manufacture and sale of printing
and fine paper;
6. The acquisitions of the stock of Carter Rice Storrs and Bement, Inc. and the assets of
Western Newspaper Union by Hammermill Paper Company are not violations of
Section 7 of the Clayton Act.

Id at 1294.

1

See id. at 1274 (finding no violation of Clayton Act because of industry standard and size

of controlled market).
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F.TC. in 1979.69 The Fruehaufcourt, cited to Brown in its reasoning, and
denied the F.T.C.'s ordering of a divestiture, claiming that for a Section 7
liability under the Clayton Act, the F.T.C. must show "a probably
anticompetitive impact", which was not present in the set of facts.
Fruehaufisone of the first examples of the permissive acceptance of vertical
mergers that became commonplace in the modem judicial system."
In 1990, courts again sanctioned a merger, this time in the D.C.
Circuit with United States v. Baker Hughes Inc. 72 In Baker, the court looked
at the totality of the circumstances instead of the government's argument
pertaining to the direct violation of law. 7 3 Baker highlighted that to violate
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, the government is required to show that the
merger will lead to an undue concentration in the market for a "particular
product in a demographic area." 7 4
In 1984, the DOJ released updated Vertical Merger Guidelines that
echoed the thoughts of many, who found that vertical mergers did not stifle
competitive business but were actually a procompetitive action.75 With the
relaxed guidelines, the DOJ stressed against the potential harm of repressing
prospective entrants to the market through vertical mergers." The updated
guidelines addressed two other possible problems that could lead to
violations of the Clayton Act: (1) "vertical mergers could create
competitively objectionable barriers to entry" and (2) vertical integration
69 See Fruehauf Corp. v. F.T.C., 603 F.2d 345, 361 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that merging of
two companies would not have negative effect on markets). The government failed to supply
evidence that the merger of the two companies would have a negative effect on customers. Id. In
contrast, the court thought that it would only provide a greater efficiency in both markets. Id.
7o See id. at 360 (finding no presence of anticompetitive impact). "It is true that some market
foreclosure may ensue from the merger, but not one that deprives rivals from major channels of
distribution, much less one that excludes them from the market altogether." Id.
71 See Noah Brumfield, Insight: Rare Court Decision Clarifies US. Merger Control Rules for
Vertical Deals, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.bna.com/insight-rare-courtn73014481742/ (commenting on lack of vertical merger blocks in past decades).
72 See United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 982 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (examining
totality of circumstances).
7 See id. at 983 (finding no violation). After looking at all the statistics provided, the court
ruled that the government "did not produce any additional evidence showing a probability of
substantially lessened competition, and thus failed to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion." Id.
74 See id (explaining reasoning of court).
71 See United States v. Ford Motor Co., 286 F. Supp. 407, 411 (E.D. Mich. 1968) ("[Nonhorizontal mergers are less likely than horizontal mergers to create competitive problems.").
76 See
id.; see also Merger Guidelines, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE (1968),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2007/07/11/11247.pdf
(providing merger
guidelines). In order to bring a suit accusing a merger of eliminating possible entrants it must
prove: "(1) the relevant market (whether upstream or downstream) must be highly concentrated,
(2) there must be high entry barriers, (3) the acquiring firm must have some sort of "entry
advantage" and (4) the acquired firm must have at least a 5 percent market share." FordMotor Co.,
286 F. Supp. at 411.
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"may facilitate collusion in the upstream market by making it easier to
monitor price" both of these thresholds are difficult to satisfy.77 The
interpretation of these statutes have been vastly different, especially with the
application of the Chicago School of thought. 8
Vertical Mergers Today
The current structure of America's largest corporations has seen an
evolution of vertical merging unlike anything the drafters of the Clayton Act
could have anticipated.79
In the last decade, multimedia giants,
pharmaceutical heavyweights, and cable company behemoths have emerged
as the byproduct of large companies merging vertically with companies
outside of their direct competition to gain advantages in multiple industries.80
Although the DOJ has not ruled on many vertical merger cases in the past
few decades, they have put a stop to some prominent potential acquisitions
that would have had a widespread impact on the landscape of modem
consumerism, including deals between GE and Avio; Pepsi and PBG; and
Coca-Cola and CCE." Alternatively, when Amazon acquired Whole Foods,
the deal went through without any of the backlash from the FTC or DOJ
which was anticipated from many prominent antitrust scholars.82
The paramount case controlling the media today is the $85.4 billion
merger between AT&T and Time Warner.83 AT&T and Time Warner are
1 See Keyte, supra note 64, at 12 (addressing qualifications needed to bring successful vertical
merger violation).
78 See sources cited, supra notes 45, 46 (discussing approaches to antitrust regulations); see
also Robert H. Lande, Proving The Obvious: The Antitrust Laws Were Passed To Protect
Consumers (Not Just To Increase Efficiency), 50 HASTINGS L.J. 959, 964 (1999) (explaining
statutory interpretations). The Chicago School of Thought structured their view of antitrust law
around the goal of efficiency. Id at 960. The School coined the "strict constructionist" view as
opposed to the "populist" view which thinks the laws "were passed to further a variety of social
and political goals, such as combating the political power of big business . . .." Id.
' See John Sallet, The Interesting Case of the Vertical Merger, DEP'T. OF JUSTICE,
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/938236/download (last visited Feb. 25, 2018) (explaining
drastic evolution of vertical mergers).
80 See id. (stating entertainment and telecom industries have led vertical mergers).
81 See id. (noting rarity of FTC finding vertical merger violations).
82 See Bryce Covert, The Real Price of Those Cheaper Avocados, SLATE,
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2017/08/we need_a_betterantitrust-standard_
to dealwith mergerslike-whole foods.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2018) (describing Amazon's
business methods). With Amazon's trend of disturbing every market it enters, there will be little
surprise that entering into the grocery market would prove any different. Id. One reason why
Amazon has been able to avoid antitrust scrutiny is their ability to undercut prices rather than
driving them up for profit, which would be a benefit for consumers. Id
83 See James B. Stewart, Battle Lines FormForEpic Antitrust Case Over AT&T-Time Warner
Merger, SEATTLE TIMES, (Nov. 16, 2017, 8:09 PM) https://www.seattletimes.com/business/battle-
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not direct competitors, triggering the Clayton Act and a vertical merger
analysis.84 This merger had the attention of the DOJ and even before filing
a complaint, the Justice Department's Antitrust division recommended to
Time Warner to sell its DirectTV unit in order to gain permission for the deal
to go through." On November 20, 2017, the DOJ announced its intent to
sue AT&T for its bid to make a telecommunications empire." The
arguments were heard before Judge Richard J. Leon of the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia.8 7 On June 12, 2018, Judge Leon issued
his decision, ruling in favor of AT&T and denied the DOJ's enjoinment of
the merger." In his 172-page opinion, Judge Leon stated, "[i]f there ever
were an antitrust case where the parties had a dramatically different
assessment of the current state of the relevant market and a fundamentally
different vision of its future development, this is the one." 9 The government
argued that if the merger was allowed, Time Warner and AT&T would have
an increased bargaining power in its ability to upcharge for its media content
that is provided to consumers.9 0 This argument was unsuccessful as the
government failed to prove that the merger would substantially lessen
lines-form-for-epic-antitrust-case-over-att-time-warner-merger/ (outlining high stakes in merger
between Time-Warner and AT&T).
* See 15 U.S.C §§ 12-27 (1914) (discussing guidelines of Clayton Act of 1914); see also
James B. Stewart, With AT&T and Time Warner, Battle Lines Formfor an Epic Antitrust Case,
N.Y. TIMEs
(Nov.
16,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/16/business/att-timewarner.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FAntitrust%/o2OLaws%20and%2OCompetition%20
ssues&action-click&contentCollection--timestopics&region=stream&module=stream-unit&versi
on=latest&contentPlacement-I&pgtype=collection (explaining vertical mergers).
A vertical
merger is defined as two companies who are not already in direct competition. Id. If the two
companies were to merge, a competitor would not be eliminated from the market, there would be
the same number of competitors as before. Id.
8s See Stewart, supra note 83 (explaining merger would create "telecom-media goliath" having
power to directly affect competitors and consumer prices). If Time Warner divested the DirectTV,
the DOJ would have been less concerned about the merger with AT&T. Id Time Warner did not
take this suggestion. Id.
86 See Brian Fung, The Justice Departmentis suing AT&T to Block its $85 billion bidfor Time
Warner, WASH. POST (Nov.
20,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theswitch/wp/2017/11/20/the-justice-department-just-sued-att-to-block-its-85-billion-bid-for-timewarner/?utm term=.a6166a7e4157 (reviewing suit brought by Justice Department). The DOJ took
action through a violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C § 18. Id.
87 See United States v. AT&T Inc., 310 F.Supp. 3d 161, 161 (D.D.C. 2018) (noting most recent
vertical merger case brought by DOJ).
88 See id. at 164 (looking at Judge Leon's reasoning for denying stay).
89 See id. at 163-64 (explaining why court found no violation). Judge Leon reasoned that the
two companies were so different that the merger would have little effect on each perspective
markets. Id.
9 See Karen Hoffman Lent & Kenneth B. Schwartz, Antitrust Yearly Wrap-Up: Active On All
Fronts,
MONDAQ
(last
updated
Jan.
14,
2019)
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/770942/Antitrust+Competition/Antitrust+Yearly+WrapU
p+Active+on+All+Fronts (discussing government's argument).
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competition. 9 ' The court came to this decision by engaging in a
comprehensive inquiry into the future competitive conditions in the market
by looking to the past decisions of Hughes and Brown Shoe.9 2 To win, the
government needed to prove that the "proposed merge ... at this time and in
the remarkably dynamic industry [was] likely to substantially lessen
competition in the manner it predicts," which it failed to do.93 The Appeals
Court granted the DOJ's motion for an expedited appeal on July 19, 2018.94
Oral arguments were held on December 6, 2018, where the panel casted
doubt on the strength of the government's argument and seemingly leaned
towards agreeing with Judge Leon's original decision.95 In February 2019,
the government lost its second challenge in front of a three-judge panel of
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and stated
that it did not intend to take the argument any further.9 6 The AT&T decision
gave a green light to many other companies in negotiating for similar deals;
and shortly after the AT&T decision landed, the DOJ had no reaction to a
$71.3 billion dollar merger deal between Disney and 21st Century Fox.9 7
Mergers like AT&T and Time Warner, Disney and Fox, Google's
acquisition of Motorola, Amazon's acquisition of Whole Foods and Kindle
Fire, or Microsoft's long-standing hardware production agreements with
Xbox, are changing the landscape of the consumer marketplace. 98 The only
method for the government to bring claims against vertical mergers is with
the Clayton Act, but even that has not proved strong enough in recent
decades.99 Is it time for Congress to once again visit the subject of vertical

9' See AT&T, 310 F. Supp. 3d at 192 (stating defendant did not create violation).
92 See id. at 189 (explaining rule of reason approach). The court focused on the language "may
be substantially to lessen competition" in Section 7 of the Clayton Act, and that a "mere" possibility
of harm would be enough to find a violation. Id.
93 See id. at 194 (reasoning behind government's failure to meet its burden).
94 See Victoria Graham, AT&T-Time Warner Appeal May Stall Vertical Mergers, Lawyers
Say, BLOOMBERG (July 24, 2018), https://www.bna.com/atttime-warner-appeal-n73014481061/
(discussing DOJ's grant of appeal).
9 See Lent, supra note 89 (discussing oral agreements for AT&T appeal).
96 See Edmund Lee and Cecilia Kang, U.S. Loses Appeal Seeking to BlockAT&T-Time Warner
Merger, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/26/business/media/atttime-warner-appeal.html (discussing current state of case).
9 See Richard Drew, Disney Fox deal valued at $71.3 billion approved by shareholders,CBS
NEWS (July 27, 2018, 11:39 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/disney-fox-deal-valued-at-713-billion-approved-by-shareholders/ (discussing Disney and Fox merger deal).
9 See How Apple Made 'Vertical Integration'HotAgain - Too Hot, Maybe, TIME (Mar. 16,
2012), available at http://business.time.com/2012/03/16/how-apple-made-vertical-integration-hotagain-too-hot-maybe/ (discussing vertical mergers in today's climate).
99 See sources cited, supra note 32 and accompanying text (discussing Clayton Act).
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mergers and enact stronger enforcements current with the industries trends
of today? 0 0
ANALYSIS
The Sherman Act of 1890 was written to enhance competition and
protect consumers across all industries. 01 At the time, the Sherman Act went
against the laissez faire foundation of how the framers saw the American
market. 102 It was not until the abuse of the railroad and pipeline industries
which brought cases like StandardOil that Congress felt it was imperative
to implement regulations to maintain fair competition in the interests of
consumers. 103 The implementation of the Sherman Act was followed by
further regulation to strengthen what it originally put in place.'" Notably,
the Clayton Act in 1914 furthered congressional guidelines on vertical
mergers to accommodate the growing demand to regulate conglomerate
business entities taking over market control. 0 s Regulations like the Clayton
Act are the only instruments the FTC and DOJ have to combat
monopolization, oligopoly, and singular market control; the question is,
should Congress revisit the outdated regulations to include a more strict view

"o See sources cited, supra notes 12 and 15 and accompanying text (showing growth of
vertical merger regulation).
o'0 See sources cited, supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text (outlining free competition
debate in America pertaining to free competition and freedom of contract); see also 15 U.S.C. §§
1-7 (2004) (citing authority of Sherman Act).
102 See Nicola Giocoli, Classicalcompetition andfreedom of contractin American laissez
faire
constitutionalism, INST.
FOR
NEW
ECON.
THINKING,
2-3
(June
10,
2014)
https://www.ineteconomics.org/uploads/papers/ClassicalCompetitionandFreedomofContract.pdf
(explaining contract history in America). The government originally thought that the markets
should be free from external forces. Id. This became increasingly difficult when trusts were
controlling much of the wealth in America. Id. at 3. Unfortunately, with the free market without
interference, Congress found that companies such as Standard Oil were becoming so powerful that
they could not only buy or put their competitors out of business, but they could regulate the product
price and the quality of the products sold in the entire industry. Id. at 1.
103 See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 1 (1911) (noting first judicial restriction
on competition in American market). StandardOil was the first case in American history using the
Sherman Act to regulate a market. Id. The Court held that Standard Oil had indeed exceeded their
market control and caused barriers of entry to competitors, had the intent to exclude others from
trade, and controlled the commodity across the market. Id. at 56-57.
10 See sources cited supra notes 2 and 10 and accompanying text (discussing evolution of
Antitrust law and regulation).
1os See Jonida Lamaj, The Evolution ofAntitrust Law in USA, 13 EuR. SCI. J. 154, 162 (2017)
(discussing Clayton Anti-Trust Act, Robinson-Patman Act of 1936 and Celler-Kefauver Act of
1950).
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on the type of vertical mergers that have become so enticing to corporate
companies?1 06
Perfect competition is defined as having multiple buyers and sellers
so that not one single action should have a noticeable impact.10 7 In the theory
of perfect competition, consumers have the opportunity to conform to their
preferences over multiple available products, prices are known to producer's,
producing capabilities are maximized by the input-output decisions to
maximize profits, and finally, every producer has equal access to the
market.10 The theory of perfect competition is threatened when
monopolistic actions enter the market place. 09
The problem of
monopolization is still evident in today's market, with the growing
popularity in vertical merging creating cross industry monopolies.110
Vertical mergers are considered problematic to the welfare of the consumers
because they tend to "[lead to] monopolistic domination of the market by a
single corporation.""' These fears mirror the government's argument in the
recent case of AT&T because if these companies are allowed to merge, they
will have bargaining power across markets, which would allow companies
to hike up prices with no other notable competition across not just one, but
multiple markets.112
Of course, not everyone believes that vertical mergers impact the
market in a negative way.1 13 Some believe that vertical mergers, instead of
106 See sources cited supra notes 12 and 15 and accompanying text (growth of vertical merger
regulation).
107 See Phillip Areeda, Louis Kaplow, and Aaron Edlin, Antitrust Analysis: Problems, Text,
and Cases, 5 (Aspen Casebook 7h ed., 2013) (discussing theory of perfect competition).
1os See id. (discussing elements of "perfect competition theory"). The theory of perfect
competition is important because it provides an equilibrium in the market and it motivates
producers to create the best product for the lowest price to gain consumer attention. Id. Without
competition in the market, producers will have the power to make the products they wish for the
prices they want, without interference from outside competitors. Id. at 7. In this scenario,
consumers are bound to lose out in a market with limited choice stemming from a single or just
handful of producers. Id.
109 See Posner, supra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing effect of monopolies on
economic markets).
10 See Keyte, supranote 64 (discussing merger methods); see also Jon Sallet, The Interesting
Case of
the
Vertical
Merger,
DEP'T.
OF
JUSTICE
(Nov.
17,
2016),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/938236/download (last visited Feb. 25, 2018) (looking at
new trends in vertical mergers).
". See Patrick Stothers Kwak, Advantages and Disadvantages of Vertical Mergers,
BIZFLUENT, https://bizfluent.com/info-8367056-advantages-disadvantages-vertical-mergers.html
(last updated Sept. 26, 2017) (outlining advantages and disadvantages of vertical mergers).
112 See Drew, supra note 96 and accompanying text (outlining bargaining power agreement).
113 See Bharat Anand, AT&T, Time Warner, and What Makes Vertical Mergers Succeed,
HARv. Bus. REv. (Oct. 28, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/10/att-time-warner-and-what-makesvertical-mergers-succeed (analyzing AT&T and Time Warner merger). The largest deal down the
pipeline in vertical mergers is AT&T and Time Warner. Id. Some think that allowing this merger

228

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY [Vol. XXIV

hurting the economy and market competition, help the economy grow and
give more options to consumers. 114 There have arguably been many mergers
that have benefited consumers, but when these mergers begin to limit
consumer choice and create barriers to entry for small businesses,
government regulation is necessary to keep some semblance of a fair and
competitive market.us As discussed earlier, antitrust regulation was needed
to protect the consumers and producers from the effects of unequal
competition. 116 Looking at Walmart, on the surface it may seem like its low
prices are a benefit to consumers, but in reality, it also has a negative effect
on producers and this negative effect can reach the consumers without the
average shopper even realizing.' 17 This leaves very little room for the
producers underneath to negotiate or be competitive in the market."'
With the recent allowance of mergers like AT&T and Time Warner,
Disney and Fox, Whole Foods with Amazon, Comcast with NBC Universal,
and Ticket Master with Live Nation, it is hard to determine if the same
outcome would have occurred if United States v. Ford Motor Co. had
happened today. 9 The DOJ was successful in their attempt to halt Ford in
would be great for customer content. Id. With the merger, consumers would have access to a
multitude of content that they previously had to access through different venues. Id The merger
would allow a customer to access much more at a single, probably lower, price point. Id.
114 See id. (merging companies can help lower prices and give consumers cheaper products).
115 See sources cited, supra notes 10 and 15 and accompanying text (discussing vertical
mergers); see also Phillip Areeda, Louis Kaplow, and Aaron Edlin, Antitrust Analysis: Problems,
Text, and Cases, 5 (Aspen Casebook 7' ed., 2013) (discussing barriers to entry is obstructing new
businesses from establishing presence in market).
116 See Fed. Trade Comm'n, supra note 37 at 570 (discussing power used by FTC to combat
anticompetitive
actions);
see
also
DOJ:
Vertical Merger Precedent, AT&T,
https://about.att.com/content/dam/sitesdocs/AT/`26TTimeWarner/FINAL%20DOJ%20Merger
(Feb. 25, 2019) (discussing
%20Precedent%200ne%20Pager/2011.19%203pmET.PDF
precedent of DOJ's restriction of vertical mergers).
117 See Barry C. Lynn, Breaking the chain: The antitrustcase against Wal-Mart, HARPER'S
MAG., 31 (July 24, 2006), https://harpers.org/archive/2006/07/breaking-the-chain/ (discussing
Walmart's business model). Walmart's business strategy is to undercut manufacturers to sell the
products at the lowest price. Id. Walmart will even create their own products to compete if the
manufacturers do not agree on a price low enough for Walmart's standards. Id. This creates an
impossible position for manufacturers and provides a less appealing product made in a lessor
quality for customers. Id.
118 See id. (discussing effect of monopolies on producers).
119 See Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 564 (1972) (discussing Ford merger);
see
also
DOJ:
Vertical
Merger
Precedent,
AT&T,
https://about.att.com/content/dam/sitesdocs/AT/26TTimeWarner/FINAL%20D0J%20Merger
(last visited Feb. 25, 2018)
%20Precedent/o200ne%2OPager/201l.19%203pmET.PDF
(discussing commonality of vertical mergers). Recently, the trend has been to grant vertical
mergers. See United States v. Ford Motor Co., 286 F.Supp. 405, 409 (E.D. Mich. 1968). With the
unlikelihood of denial, companies are granted access to conspire and to control their supply chain,
which is what Fordwas denied of in 1972. Id. Ford was denied because if granted the control over
the supply chain, it would have had too much market power. Id. This same logic could be said for
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acquiring a supply chain used in their cars, however, only a few years later
in Hammermill, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania determined that the merger was beneficial for the paper
market. 120 The trend of Hammermill, Hughes, and more recently AT&T,
seems to suggest that courts do not see a danger in allowing these companies
to control multiple markets. 12 1 If the government wishes to bring future
cases, it will need to provide evidence that these kinds of mergers are not
beneficial for the markets, even if analyzed under the rule of reason
approach. 122 Perhaps if courts fail in regulating vertical mergers with the
current statutes under the Clayton Act, the government will take action and
pass further legislation to allow the DOJ to effectively stop mergers when
they see a threat to the markets.
In the coming years, there will be a lot to look forward to when it
comes to antitrust regulation. 123 Despite the United States Court of Appeals,
District of Columbia Circuit decision, the DOJ's attempt to halt AT&T and
Time Warner shows an aggressive stance in favor of strong antitrust
regulation contrary to the DOJ's stance in previous decades. 124 Next in the
pipeline is the expected FTC report following the agency's Hearings on
Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21St Century, which will add
some guidance on the present climate of vertical mergers. 125 If courts are
Comcast and NBC Universal, or Ticket Master and Live Nation where there was no action from
the DOJ present. Id.
120 See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962); FordMotor Co., 405 U.S.
at 411 (stressing importance of analyzing product markets for fairness in market competition); see
also United States v. Hammermill Paper Co., 429 F. Supp. 1271, 1293 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (involving
Ford and Hammermill merging supply chains with producers, Ford was denied and Hammermill
granted).
121 See Hammermill Paper Co., 429 F. Supp. at 1293 (discussing shift from per se to rule of
reason resulting shift for vertical merger decisions).
122 See Elizabeth Winkler, AT&TNot Out ofthe Legal Woods Yet, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 6,2018),
(analyzing how
https://www.wsj.com/articles/at-t-not-out-of-the-legal-woods-yet-1533549600
government's new approach could win under rule of reason).
123 See id. (allowance of AT&T merger steps towards growing trend of vertical mergers).
124 See Joshua D. Wright, Whither ConservativeMerger Policy?, NAT'L REV., (Jan. 24, 2018,
7:35 AM), available at http://www.nationalreview.com/article/455728/donald-trumps-antitrustenforcement-conservative-merger-policy (discussing merger policy).
Vertical restraints (including mergers) frequently yield procompetitive benefits and only
on rare occasion result in any anticompetitive harms. Indeed, the DOJ's chief economist,
Luke Froeb, has explained that "there is a paucity of support for the proposition that
vertical restraints and vertical integration are likely to harm consumers." This statement
is supported by a tremendous empirical literature, which recognizes that exceptions exist
but also demonstrates that these exceptions are few and far between.
Id.

To

125 See Jacqueline Grise et al., Antitrust Trends In 2019: Enforcement Watch List For The Year
at
available
2019),
10,
(Jan.
MONDAQ
Come,
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holding that there are mainly procompetitive effects of vertical mergers,
perhaps the DOJ will also take that stance and lobby for more restrictive
legislative action from Congress. 12 6
CONCLUSION
The Sherman Act along with the Clayton Act were passed to protect
the consumers and emerging businesses in the United States. What started
out as a way to combat the amassing of wealth of the American elite, has
turned into a regulatory force that has allowed Congress and the courts to
rule on what can and cannot be tolerated in American businesses. Congress
and the courts have a robust history of ruling that standard monopoly
practices are harmful, but provide limited direction when determining the
harm of a vertical merger. Courts and Congress need to solidify their stance
on the effects and allowance of these mergers, and to what extent noncompeting companies can merge.
Generally, vertical mergers do not have the same anti-competitive
effect on the economy and consumers as horizontal mergers, and in turn,
vertical merger regulations should be more relaxed. Many believe that
vertical merges help foster creativity and integrate efficiencies between
purchaser and seller instead of negatively affecting them. America was built
upon the theory of capitalism and the freedom of business, so to some,
antitrust regulation goes against everything for which this country was
formed. Although on the surface allowing these mergers seems probusiness, these deals are primarily taking place between the elite of the elite
and are limiting the small businessperson chances of breaking into the
market. Companies like Amazon and Walmart are regulating the products
we buy and the prices we buy them for. It is not a stretch to think that this
practice can have a series of negative impacts on the quality or the quantity
of the products we purchase over time. Combating price fixing and
regulating quality of products were the original principles behind the
Sherman and Clayton Act in the twentieth century. Without regulation,
companies would be able to control the landscape of American consumerism
without the input of the consumer and will bar new entry for young
enterprises.
With the merge of AT&T with Time Warner, and Disney with 21st
Century Fox, we will start to see what shape vertical mergers will take in

http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/771056/Antitrust+Competition/Antitrust+Trends+In+201
9+Enforcement+Watch+List+For+The+Year+To+Come (looking to DOJ for guidance on future
vertical mergers).
126 See Lee, supra note 96 (discussing allowance of AT&T and Time Warner merger).
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American businesses and the economic landscape. The allowance of these
mergers may prompt Congress to act and pass further legislation on the
matter but considering the procompetitive benefits courts have already
discussed when ruling on vertical merger cases, this is unlikely to happen in
the current climate. One thing is clear, the controversy surrounding vertical
mergers is not likely to go away any time soon.
Natalie Brough

